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OVERVIEW OF THE AMERICAN CITY
American cities can be looked at in many ways, but one thing
everyone should be able to agree on is that they are in big trouble.
They are dilapidated, congested, trash-strewn, unsafe, rebellion-
prone, poverty-stricken, polluted, frightened, demoralized and gen-
erally on the run. They give every indication of being beyond hope,
and little leadership or new ideas are in evidence suggesting other-
wise.
Actually all cities throughout the industrial world are in trouble,
but U. S. cities seem to be especially bad. In contrast, Toronto and
Montreal, which Americans visit in great numbers, have a completely
different tone. Not only do they look better, they feel a whole lot
better, with an optimism and verve that is noticeably absent from
Chicago, Cleveland, New York or Los Angeles. This is a striking
paradox, that the richest and most powerful nation in the world is
losing its ability to maintain healthy communities, that somehow ma-
terial growth has created problems that are bigger than the people,
not just in the environment but in social and psychological life as well.
This article will be an attempt to take a cold look at this situation.
The approach will be sociological, with an eye toward social relations
and problems of organization. It will be diagnostic, with an emphasis
on what is wrong and how it might be righted. This analysis will also
be from the heart, for I have lived in American cities all my forty
years and my six children will probably be doing the same. These
are my cities and their sadness is my sadness.
I will begin by discussing some of the broader trends in recent
American history which characterize the whole of national life and
not just the cities. It is a mistake to view our urban problems in
isolation from the rest of the country, as though they were brought by
processes that only occur in cities and could be changed merely by
changing something about cities. This country is a single country,
and the decisions that come from the national power centers, the
White House, large corporations, Wall Street, the Pentagon, the Con-
gress, and so on, are decisive for the health of local communities of
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all kinds. I will therefore discuss four national trends which are
crucial for understanding the urban problem.
Then I will focus more closely on the cities themselves and the
way in which national problems have taken their toll in a special way
there.
Finally I will discuss how these damaging trends might be re-
versed, or at least slowed down, referring in particular to the service
professions.
RECENT NATIONAL TRENDS THAT HAVE HURT CITIES
WAR
For more than thirty years the United States has been at war in
one sense or another. First World War II, then Korea, then ten ex-
pensive years of Cold War and finally seven more hot ones in Viet
Nam, which still continues. Throughout this period innumerable bil-
lions of dollars have been spent getting into fights or preparing for
them, while the public treasury has been so depleted that cities have
been falling apart. There is no question about the money being there.
All the cities' money needs could be more than taken care of by di-
verting money from the military to civilian use; but war and exces-
sive anti-Communism have kept them from this.
This is not the place to analyze the politics of the Cold War, but if
one reads the newer revisionist historians, he or she will find a
strong argument that there need not have been a Cold War, nor a Viet
Nam, and possibly not a Korea. These were largely American mis-
takes, and they were made at incredible expense in community wel-
fare. One might say that in fighting imaginary enemies abroad, or
enemies that did not have to be enemies, the U.S. bled itself white at
home.
What makes this waste even worse is that it was preceded by ten
years of still another kind of waste in the Great Depression, which
also took a vast toll from the physical and social health of the cities.
That waste came from weakness in the economy and an unwillingness
on the part of national leaders to make changes in the 1920s that
might have prevented the depression of the 1930s. In either case the
material costs have been enormous, and the money needed for social
services and decent housing has gone up in smoke.
It seems obvious that the U.S., and especially its cities, will never
be healthy until money is no longer poured into military ventures.
Just what that might require in revisions of foreign policy no one can
say exactly, but it certainly requires that the U.S. stop assuming that
every country that becomes socialist is inevitably its military enemy.
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DOING NOTHING ABOUT INEQUALITY
Throughout this period of public waste, material inequality among
social classes and ethnic groups has gone almost unchanged. Average
incomes have gone up because the size of the pie has increased, but
the shares that different groups have received have not changed. If
anything, the bottom 10 or 20 percent of the population get an even
smaller share of the dollars than they did at the beginning of the
century. The statistics on this whole question are imprecise, but the
general pattern of unchanging inequality is clear.
Why is inequality a problem for the cities? There was a time when
the U.S. could more easily tolerate large gaps between the rich, the
middle groups and the poor because there was a certain acceptability
attached to these differences. The immigrants in the cities had come
from countries that had strong traditions of aristocracy, and the
American aristocracy of dollars did not grate against them. The
same was true for the native poor, the various dark peoples in the
rural South or Southwest. All they wanted was to be secure on the
bottom rung of the ladder, and perhaps to go up a notch. Equality with
their "betters" was beyond their ken.
But in the last seventy years the idea of equality has obtained an
importance in this country it never had before. This is probably
largely because there is a new kind of symbolic equality in the
twentieth century. In the nineteenth century, the only equality was
political and legal; one man had one vote, and all were equal before
the law, but even this had serious limitations. Economically, there
was a vague feeling that everyone should have an equal chance to get
rich, an equality of opportunity, but it never went beyond a vague
feeling. It was certainly never implied that there should be an equal-
ity of position itself, with people all living at about the same level.
In the twentieth century, symbolic equality has gone beyond the
political-legal level into the spheres of education and information.
Schooling has been enormously equalized in recent decades. The
average American and even the poor receive a schooling much closer
to that of the elite than ever before. This democratization of school-
ing, however, has had little effect on the democratization of incomes.
The same effect comes from other symbolic changes. The mass
media, especially radio and television, provide a tremendous amount
of information to the ordinary American that he did not have in the
old days. He has a much better idea of what is happening in this
country, of its problems and how he ranks in relation to those above
him. And he is much more liable to want what they have! Mass
advertising alone, with the mass production of consumer goods that
stands behind it, ensures that ordinary greed will be democratized as
never before. If a country democratizes its education, its status
symbols, its information, and does little or nothing about the distribu-
tion of wealth and income, then that country is in for a lot of trouble.
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That is exactly what has been happening, especially since World
War II. There is now a built-in source of anger and resentment, and
this has focused especially in the cities. One of the ways this shows
up is in ordinary property theft, a fast way to share the wealth. An-
other is in the urban rebellion of Blacks, Chicanes, and Puerto
Ricans. Whether one interprets these actions as deliberate attempts
to change things or as irrational outbursts, either way they stem from
the pangs of a feeling that inequality is unjust and that it is legitimate
to rebel.
Inferiority of economic position seems to be especially galling
when superimposed on ethnic inferiority. Poverty does not hurt as
much if one is in the dominant white ethnic group with full status in
the ethnic market, but if one is considered ugly and sub-human as
well as being poor, then this is doubly painful. This is more serious
as the lower ethnic groups become a greater proportion of the urban
population. The old urban poor of several decades ago, mostly
Catholic or Jewish, were lowly but not the lowest. The new urban
poor are from the bottom groups: Blacks, Puerto Ricans, Chicanes,
Indians, and Southern whites, all of whom were formerly rural
dwellers. When they were safely tucked away in the small towns and
farms of the South, Southwest, or Puerto Rico, they were a much less
angry group of people. But being crowded together in cities is an al-
together more radicalizing experience, which will be discussed later.
Therefore, a second national trend, which is causing enormous
trouble for cities, is that the U.S. just cannot seem to do anything
about that "new deal" long talked about. The old inequality remains,
yet its symbolic justification, its moral rightness,has been thoroughly
shattered since World War II. Of course, part of the solution to the
second trend is doing something about the first.
BUREAUCRACY
The term "bureaucracy" refers to those large, impersonal, top-
down organizations that are absorbing more and more ordinary human
activity. The great -grandparents of this generation, wherever they
were, were farmers, small businessmen, professionals, craftsmen
and ordinary workmen in ordinary workshops. People today have
become organization men and women, working and living in giant
power centers which nobody seems to own or control. There was a
time in this country when increased size, impersonality, and strict
organizational discipline were progressive trends. Size cuts costs;
impersonality prevents corruption and favoritism; and discipline
standardizes output. Bureaucracy, in other words, is often the only
route to efficiency. But it has its limits. Eventually it stifles inno-
vation, encourages buck-passing, instills dead traditions of its own,
and, above all, keeps the individual from the fulfillment he can get
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only in acting autonomously, under his own steam. Eventually the
psychological costs of large-scale organization offset its material
benefits. In fact, if activity is too boring and deadly, even efficiency
and material benefits decline.
While inequality is the special grievance of the urban underclass,
bureaucracy plays the same role for the middle class, especially its
youth. If the New Left of the 1960s had any central message, it was
that giant organizations have outlived their usefulness, and that new
forms, which permit autonomy and participation, must be developed.
This is actually just a restatement of good old American frontier
values, and it touches a deep yen in everyone. But the depression and
the wars took the independence out of many and increased tolerance
for regimentation. To many older people who lived through the 1930s
and are glad to have any job at all, regardless of how impersonal or
programmed it may be, this complaint of middle class youth sounds
absurd. Young people, however, are living in a completely different
psychological world, in many ways more valid and futuristic than that
of their parents.
Precisely because young people have not known a prolonged eco-
nomic depression and have come to take a minimum of material
security for granted, they place a great premium on psychological
fulfillment. And they do not find it in present institutions, large uni-
versities, trade unions, political parties, government agencies and
business corporations. Instead, youth say, bureaucracies are a
psychological gauntlet in which their inner selves are molded into
interchangeable parts, their softest sentiments into fixed smiles,
their autonomy into automata.
The big city, along with the comfortable suburbs in which these
young people grew up, is viewed as the home of bureaucracy. This
means that many of the most talented and sensitive young Americans
are fleeing the cities, physically and psychologically. If they cannot
get out, they set up their own youth ghettos or counter-cultures within
cities. At a time when this country needs talent and innovation more
than ever, many of the most talented are turning their backs on the
task, and the very bureaucracies that need new blood and fresh ideas
are too rigid and overdeveloped for the self-reform that might attract
idealistic youth.
Bureaucracy is the channel for much of the material waste de-
scribed above, and it is the foundation for much of the inequality too.
The Pentagon and its wars is only the capstone of this whole system.
The entire organizational landscape needs humanization.
POLLUTION
Finally one must consider the destruction of the environment,
which has galloped so swiftly in recent years. The water, the soil,
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the air, the flora and fauna the whole of Mother Nature is being
squandered. The dimensions of this problem are just now being ex-
amined, but it looks as though American wealth is a cruel hoax on the
future. Just as some children take certain drugs that give immediate
thrills at the expense of permanent damage, the gross national product
has turned out to be the most costly drug of all. This problem goes
well beyond the question of cities, but it is the cities that are being
hurt the most. Pollution hastens the flight from the cities for those
who can afford it. It confirms the suspicions of youth that our institu-
tions are morally bankrupt, it demoralizes those who do try to do
something about the liveability of cities, and it further bewilders a
leadership that is already totally confused.
Pollution worsens the inequality problem because it subsidizes the
rich and hits the poor the hardest, it worsens the bureaucracy prob-
lem by burning up people for product, and it increases waste by being
the biggest waste of all.
The four trends wars, inequality, bureaucracy, and pollution-
seem to lie behind the sadness of our cities. All countries have these
to some extent, but the U.S. is farthest along the suicide trail. The
U.S. has the most military waste, the most smoldering inequality, the
most gargantuan bureaucracies and the most tortured environment.
There is little wonder that its cities are becoming uninhabitable, but
there is much wonder that its people are so helpless to do anything
about it.
SPECIFICALLY URBAN TRENDS
While the roots of urban problems are to be found in national prob-
lems, these trends have had their worst effects in the big cities.
Since World War II there have been certain qualitative changes in city
social life, deriving largely from the trends already described, which
have made cities especially bad places in which to live and especially
resistant to favorable change. I will again discuss some trends, this
time getting somewhat more concrete and closer to the problems of
the urban professional.
THE URBANIZATION OF THE RURAL POOR
I have already mentioned the special importance of the rural poor
moving to the cities and replacing the earlier waves of immigrants.
What has happened is that a scattered, unorganized rural proletariat
has become a concentrated, physically contiguous urban proletariat.
This has made them much more angry than they had ever been down
on the farm. It has also exposed them to the new forces of symbolic
equality mentioned earlier, as they sit there for years and years of
schooling, watching the parade of wealth and power on their television
sets and living side-by-side with the high-rise urban middle class.
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Even though in dollar terms, urban poverty is less severe than
rural, we are beginning to see that it hurts a good deal more. This is
because it is more "naked' in terms of moral or social cushioning.
To use Karl Polanyi's term, "social embeddedness" is lacking for
the new urban poor. Rural poverty, with the softening effects of
church, local elite, and even the soothing effects of being close to
nature is lacking for the new poor in their post-war urban ghettos. If
anything, the urban environment makes their poverty worse because
it makes their social situation more transparent and unrelieved.
To put this another way, the most declassed ethnic groups have
moved from the rural fringe to the urban center of national life.
Politically, this was a most important move because it increased
their power enormously, the power to see and be seen, to intensify
moral contradictions, to challenge inequality through crime and
political rebellion, and to throw a monkey wrench into the institutional
works. American poverty and ethnic untouchability, once safely
tucked away in the background, have now moved to the foreground.
This means they can no longer be safely ignored. It also means that
cities will be pressure cookers of anger and despair as long as cities
and city conditions remain as they are.
THE FLIGHT OF JOBS TO THE SUBURBS
One of the most ironic facts about the new urban poor is that they
arrived in the cities, pushed from farms by agricultural moderniza-
tion, just as the good jobs were leaving the cities. Most of the new
jobs in recent years have appeared in the suburbs as part of the trend
toward industrial decentralization. The main unskilled jobs left in the
cities, within easy range of the poor, are the low-paid underclass jobs
in retail stores, personal service, nonprofit institutions, and light
manufacturing. The unwillingness of the suburbs to build low-cost
housing and permit dark ethnic groups within their boundaries has, in
turn, confined the new poor to the low-cost, but badly overpriced,
slum housing, far from the better industrial jobs.
This, of course, is totally unnecessary by any kind of efficiency
logic, but it is very logical when one considers the emotional power
of racial prejudice. People moved to the suburbs in the first place
largely to get away from the lower ethnic groups. Naturally they are
not going to turn around now and invite them into their new communi-
ties. To protect suburban bigotry, the new poor are separated from
the new jobs, even while the suburbanites are muttering about crime
in the streets and people who "don't want to work."
THE DEPLETION OF URBAN ORGANIZATION
At the same time the rural poor have been plopped into the cities,
and the good jobs shifted to the suburbs, the chance for the new poor
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to get organized and do something about it has greatly diminished. To
appreciate this point one must go back a few decades in urban history.
The inter-war urban poor of the 1920s and 1930s were largely
Catholics of recent Southern or Central European origins. There
were also Jews, especially in New York City, and some Protestants,
but the central type was the Slavic or Mediterranean Catholic.
This religious attachment was an important organizational bond
and, by contrast with the new poor, it had two important consequences.
It gave poverty a socially embedded quality so that it did not hurt as
much, and it offered possibilities for collective action that would help
the poor to climb out of poverty. These resources, in descending
order of importance, were fourfold: the Church itself, trade unions,
political machines and ethnic societies.
The Catholic Church has always been an enormous friend to the
American establishment, for it constantly acted as a conservative in-
fluence on the Catholic urban poor. The European Church's hostility
to socialism, and its suspicion of labor unions and popular govern-
ment were transferred to this country, and, through the enormous in-
fluence of the clergy, shaped the ordinary poor Catholic into an
obedient citizen, quiet in his grievances and slow to see the injustices
of his society. Poverty was, in fact, defined as a religious blessing,
making it easier to get into heaven, which doubtlessly made it much
easier to bear.
When joint action was needed, as with trade unions, the Church
used all its influence to keep these organizations from moving very
far to the left. These influences were moderating and anti-reform,
but there were progressive influences of a sort too. The Church
acted as a super-ethnic group, a culture carrier which gave the Cath-
olic proletariat a view of life as larger than themselves, for inter-
posed between themselves and the continent-wide state there stood a
firm well- organized community which was theirs, and out of reach of
the Protestants who ran the country. Thus Catholic poverty was de-
fined, segragated, cushioned and even sacramentalized in a way that
softened its effects and muted its political thrust.
From this basic community and culture, the Church also acted as
the social basis for much of Catholic secular organization, especially
ethnic societies, trade unions and political machines. These secular
organizations were largely extensions of the Holy Name Societies,
Knights of Columbus chapters, and Catholic Alumni associations of
the cities. Perhaps the classic case of how this worked occurred in
one neighborhood, Stockyards Chicago, in which the Back of the Yards
Neighborhood Council (B.Y.N.C.) was organized in the late 1930s.
This was a coalition of the Catholic pastors, the ethnic societies, the
packinghouse union, and then gradually the local businesses and
Democratic politicians. The B.Y.N.C. was an extremely good thing
for the neighborhood, and while it did not end the Great Depression
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World War II did that it did gather the scattered political resources
and give the people a united voice downtown with City Hall and the
Cardinal. It also helped them develop a great deal of neighborhood
pride and cooperation, and to this day that old neighborhood looks
better than it did thirty years ago! The B.Y.N.C. is frequently cited
as a bad example of neighborhood organization because it seems to
have slipped into a certain amount of racism in recent years, fearful
of the drift of the South Side Black ghetto. This is true, although it
scarcely matches the more sophisticated racism of the suburbs. In
any case it illustrates the organizational resources that were avail-
able to the Catholic poor.
In contrast, the new urban poor have none of these organizational
capabilities. Religiously they are a mixture with no church strong
enough to organize the others. Above all the Blacks are in small,
non-centralized Protestant churches, which, while they supply many
individual leaders from the preacher ranks, do not supply an overall
sense of membership, loyalty and organization. The Spanish-speaking
Catholics are themselves fragmented into Mexican origin, Puerto
Ricans and others, and their Catholic origins are much more anti-
clerical and disorganized than were the Europeans'.
In a similar way, ethnic societies among the new poor are weak
and poorly developed, especially among the Blacks who are still try-
ing to define their ethnicity in a positive way. In fact, the new poor
are ethnically antagonistic to each other, and the process of organiz-
ing one section can often be done only by mobilizing hostility toward
other sections. This fighting over crumbs, as a Black congressman
recently called it, is most counterproductive, but it illustrates the
bind.
In the trade unions the new poor are again in an inferior position,
for they work in predominantly non-unionized sectors of the economy,
in jobs too isolated for easy organization and at pay too small to at-
tract the dues-conscious established unions. When they are in unions,
as in the Detroit auto plants, they find that the union hierarchy is still
occupied by the representatives of the old poor who organized these
unions some decades ago.
When one looks for the political machine, it turns out it has been
weakened in most cities, and what is left is still largely controlled by
the old ethnics, who bring in the new under distinctly subordinate
conditions.
All this is dramatized in the career of the urban community or-
ganizer, Saul Alinsky. Alinsky was the key organizer of the Chicago
Stockyards neighborhood in the 1930s. Afterwards he tried to or-
ganize in various underclass communities, Mexican-American and
Black, and while he had limited successes in some Black communi-
ties, notably Rochester, New York, and the Woodlawn neighborhood of
Chicago, these organizations do not seem to have lasted well. Alinsky
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is now back to the middle third the better paid working and middle
class and has become part of the recent move to glamourize the
plight of the middle American. This pattern is especially visible in
Chicago, where among the thirty or so neighborhood organizations,
those of the new poor are largely paper organizations, while those of
Catholic neighborhoods are much more likely to have mass participa-
tion and organizational muscle. The only real underclass organiza-
tion in Chicago is the top-down kind, within the Democratic machine,
and this provides little benefit for the Chicago underclass as a whole.
The new poor then, in addition to feeling the weight of the oppres-
sive national trends described earlier, also find themselves in angry
ghettos, without residential or transportation access to the better
industrial jobs and without the organizational levers it would take to
do something about their situation.
WHAT CAN BE DONE?
The picture is such a gloomy one that one is tempted to say nothing
can be done, and let it go at that. It is always much easier to criti-
cize a troubled society than to make suggestions for improvement,
but this itself is no accident. It is not because critics tend to be
"non- constructive" and unwilling to just go along with whatever
meager reforms a society may be making. Rather, it is because
societies in trouble develop defenses and blocks that inhibit construc-
tive thought, much as neurotics blinker themselves to keep from fac-
ing their problems. These defenses range from relatively mild
controls over teaching, preaching, writing, and electioneering to
more severe controls over new social movements which are labeled
illegal and subversive. An excellent example of this is the suppres-
sion of the "citizen participation" movement of the poverty program,
which was an excellent new idea, but which unfortunately threatened
the vested interests of certain urban political machines. For this
reason it had to go, and cities are therefore deprived of all the new
attempts to solve urban problems which that program should have
been allowed to explore. The same is true for any number of radical
ideas and social experiments that were initiated and repressed
throughout the 1960s. The normal process of experimentation, brain-
storming, boat-rocking and social change which a society must permit
if it is to find new solutions to new problems has been stunted in the
U.S., and there is consequently a dearth of fresh ideas.
This process is itself a major element in our urban problem. To
put this another way, the goals of a rational urban policy are easy
enough to determine; just reverse everything said in the earlier part
of this article. Unfortunately the means to do this are all illegal, un-
patriotic, or have been suppressed before they were allowed to be
fully invented.
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Certainly a continuation of present responses looks like a loser.
Current public programs range from the trivial to the harmless to
the downright destructive. Law and order programs are not eliminat-
ing crime, and may actually be increasing it. Bigger and bigger
urban bureaucracies do little more than worsen the bureaucracy
problem. Spending programs based on inequitable tax structures
deepen the inequality. Symbolic reforms that yield only token or
"demonstration" programs just widen the gap between symbolic and
real equality. And wars, aimed at protecting but actually hurting the
country, just drain energies away. Going in circles and hoping that
this country will "muddle through" as we have done so often in the
past just does not look like it will work this time.
The old American way of handling problems "from below" was a
combination of divide and conquer (Protestant vs. Catholic, Black vs.
white, etc.), buying off leaders, making minor concessions and hoping
that across-the-board productivity gains would handle the rest. But
in the last twenty or thirty years this country has been undergoing
nothing less than a moral revolution, in which traditional citizenship
ideals are being taken seriously by bottom groups. The declassed
groups are now taking the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of
Rights seriously and they demand to be treated like all other Ameri-
cans. This is scarcely an excessive demand, and it is amazing that it
took so long for them to make it. This means that the key problem of
the U.S., and especially of its cities, is one of giving full citizenship
to all Americans.
This also means the solution to the urban problem is largely one
of finding new political means and methods. Positive programs will
come only with a power change, and one that is long overdue. A na-
tion's political power structure may lag a bit behind the times, but
only for a while, and then at some cost. Eventually politics must ex-
press basic morals; it must reflect what large groups of people think
is just and due, otherwise that nation will be ungovernable. It is
exactly that gap, between morality and politics, which has been widen-
ing in the U.S. and this is why the country is drifting more deeply into
crime, demoralization and ungovernability. In a sense the solution is
that all groups be given approximately the same amount of real
political power, and then let solutions be found through a true demo-
cratic process, but that is too general a way of putting it.
Of course the best way to organize the bottom groups (by which I
mean uniting political resources so that they will have more effect
than if they remain scattered) would be if the people at the top, who
own and run most of this country, did everything they could to pro-
mote organization at the bottom. But even though this would be in the
country's best interests and in everyone's long run interests (i.e.,
our grandchildren's), the top people are afraid, and rightly so, that
they would lose political and economic power in the short run.
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Organizing the bottom will inevitably lead to a redistribution of polit-
ical power, which in turn will lead to some economic redistribution.
Given that people at the top of any society tend to be selfish and
shortsighted, the voluntary giving over of organization and power will
not happen. Organization can only happen by going against the grain,
with all the bumpiness that that implies.
ETHNICITY
Earlier I discussed underclass ethnicity, in contrast to the Catho-
lic forms of ethnicity, as a weak point, but there are hidden strengths.
Ethnicity is always a latent resource because it is something emo-
tional that people have in common and can use as a basis for joint
action. When the Catholics came en masse to this country, they had
little ethnic identification at first. Instead of seeing themselves as
Italians or Poles or Hungarians, they identified with their home
village or regions, and only slowly did they adopt a broader ethnic
consciousness. Ethnicity, as a resource, had to be formed; it was not
immediately formed. The same seems to be true for the underclass
ethnics. Blacks are badly divided into light and dark, middle class,
working class and underclass, rural and urban and so on. These
splits impede the creation of an ethnic group, and until they are
reasonably healed, the tremendous latent power of Black ethnicity
will not be fully usable.
The Spanish -speaking people are divided into two main groups,
Mexican-origin and Puerto Rican, with further splits within each
group. On the edge are Cubans, Philippinos and various South Amer-
icans. The Spanish- speaking legislators in the House and Senate
are beginning to explore the possibilities of a legislative coalition,
but it will be a long time before their masses begin working together.
American Indians are only "Indians," an outsiders' word, to non-
Indians; they identify themselves as Dakota, Potawatomi, Cherokee
and so on. Tribalism is their ethnicity, and the only connection
among tribes is a vanguard movement called "pan-tribalism." They
do not identify with an ethnic group called "Indian" and therefore
their concentrations in Northern cities are utterly disunited into a
myriad of separate tribes. The same is true of Southern whites from
the border states, whose basic identity is often the county of origin,
and woe betide the outsider from some other county who strays into
that county's favorite bar in Detroit, Chicago or Cincinnati.
In other words, the underclass ethnic groups are not yet ethnic
groups and therefore do not have the organizational -political power of
ethnicity at their disposal. Time will change this, but any rallying
points that can speed up the process will speed up power.
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MATERIAL INTERESTS
If the established trade union movement and the major political
parties are ineffective channels of organization for interests, then
others should be tried. Two obvious possibilities are government
welfare and tenant -landlord relations. Both are already the bases of
organization, in the National Welfare Rights Organization and the
National Tenants Organization. These groups are against the grain of
national propriety, for paupers on welfare and public housing should
be humble, not aggressive, but they are very much in the grain of the
underclass situation, and these two organizations are a natural for an
eventual merger of some kind.
Prisoners and ex-convicts are another natural place for organiza-
tion, for loss of citizenship rights and job discrimination against
those who presumably have paid their debt to society seems clearly
unjust. Prison organization itself is also clearly in need of drastic
change.
The low-paid, and as yet unorganizable jobs are still another na-
tural place for underclass organization. This will take imaginative,
dedicated organizers and new forms of organization, but surely some
of the underclass occupations could be organized.
LOCAL CONTROLS
The decentralization of all forms of public administration, includ-
ing the decentralization of real power, looks to be very much in the
interest of the underclass. There was a time when centralization,
even to the national level, was the more progressive avenue. This
was because the brand of localism at the time was not local enough; it
was local control by local middle and upper class elites. But cen-
tralization of administration, in the federal bureaucracies, is no
longer always the more progressive form of administration; the pov-
erty program proved that. Now local control to a level below that of
local elites is the more progressive approach, and even though some
explorations will probably prove unsuccessful, any change in this
direction looks helpful for underclass organization and power.
VOTING
Malcolm X used to talk about "bullets or ballots," and he would
end up saying the choice was up to the establishment, not the masses.
Maybe he was right at the time, but not now. Bullets will not work,
period, no matter who chooses them. And it is beginning to look as
though some decent reforms can come in this country through the
ballot. Two trends indicate this: the new vote for eighteen year olds
and the drive to register voters among the underclass. Especially if
these two trends combine some serious political reforms can be ex-
pected in the next decade. The new local political arenas will be the
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communities where these two trends can have their greatest effect,
Black cities and college towns, and especially smaller cities that have
both groups. This will not make for national change in itself, but it
will supply laboratory communities in which enough progressive
political power will exist to try new things. It will also supply
"model cities" for other cities to copy. It could also provide the
anchor points for larger state and regional political moves. It would
be a mistake to expect the new vote to make major changes, but it is
a new resource and can be combined with others.
I will not discuss some of the more tangential possibilities for
change that are on the scene, but one that could go either "left" or
"right" is the new mobilization of "middle Americans," primarily
Catholics in the North and Protestants in the South. This middle
group is now a political football, rebounding from those higher to
those lower, back and forth. They have traditionally oriented to
classes above them, and will probably do so again, but there is a
chance that they will make limited alliances with those below, espe-
cially if the Catholic hierarchy begins looking more kindly toward
serious social reform. If there is ever to be a progressive third
party, or a strong move toward reform by one of the major parties, it
will require an alliance between underclass and working class, not an
extremely likely possibility, but one worth working toward.
THE MIDDLE CLASS PROFESSIONAL
Underlying this discussion of underclass organization is the ques-
tion of the role of middle class professionals. That many of them will
vote and contribute money in a progressive direction is assumed, but
their actual professional work must now be examined.
One of the greatest ironies of urban life is that many of the most
humane and tolerant of the middle class, the social workers, teachers,
professors, librarians, nurses, and so on are unwittingly engaging in
the worst injustices. This is so because they work for agencies and
organizations that are institutionally oppressive, and despite the
personal good intentions of these various professionals, the policies
of their organizations and the conditions under which they work make
the consequences of their actions immoral. Librarians can only work
within the limits of the books that are actually published and pur-
chased for use in their libraries and the canons of library "profes-
sionalism"; teachers within the confines of their curricula, employing
testing criteria and demands from the next higher educational level;
social workers within the laws, agency rules and benefit restrictions;
nurses within doctors' traditions, medical technology and hospital
potential, and so on. These institutions are all tilted toward the
middle class or working class and away from the underclass. This
inequality is manifested in a number of ways.
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The location of many service institutions, particularly hospitals
and better universities, is, like the newer suburban jobs, out of reach
for the urban underclass. The style of interaction and speech is im-
personal and formal, thereby presenting an uninviting atmosphere for
the more earthy and informal underclass. The mobility strategy is to
lift the more motivated and talented clients into a higher class rather
than helping the whole group move up collectively. The power
strategy, by the logic of bureaucracy, is to foster dependency for
clients rather than independence and autonomy. And the target for
service is the better -off and more elite members of the underclass or
working class (called "creaming" in some organizations), rather than
the ordinary or hardship cases.
Recalling Herbert Laswell's famous definition of politics as "who
gets what, when and how," it must be admitted that service bureau-
cracies are politically biased against the underclass, even when
officially designed to serve them. This bias would have to be re-
versed before the vast horde of goodhearted service professionals
can engage in actions which actually have good effects. The same is
true for the masses of humanitarian young students who are now
graduating from our universities and entering nonprofit organizations
and service professions. They will have to change the institutional
makeup of these professions and organizations before their good in-
tentions will have effect.
This means that the notion of "advocacy," modeled after the role
of the lawyer who disinterestedly helps whatever client is his, will
have to be applied across-the-board to all the professions. The
circle of change will then be one in which professionals truly help the
underclass and give them self-help skills, the underclass use these
skills to improve their own organization and political power, they use
this power to change the service professions even more, and thus the
vicious circle gets reversed.
The role of librarians, therefore, is to examine the politics of
their profession, make whatever changes in style and content are
necessary for "advocacy," and give the information and skills which
the new urban poor actually need. This information and skill will
doubtlessly be related to the resources already mentioned: ethnic
organization, material organization, local control, and voting. It will
also be related to other resources that can only be discovered through
trial and error.
Thus time has outmoded the old model or stereotype of the librar-
ian, standing innocently over piles of musty books, dressing in the
fashions of the previous generation, shushing the natural impulses of
children and blossoming youth, glossing over the problems of the
community, and responding pliantly to the powers that be. The times
have placed librarians at the center of social change, inviting them to
use the immense power of information to help give new life and health
to sad cities.
